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Abstract
This paper empirically assesses the effects of socio-economic and demographic
variables on violent crime in the United States. Using national-level time-series data
over the period 1960-2000, an unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model was
estimated for overall violent crime, murder, rape and assault. The results indicate that
there is no long-run relationship among the examined variables, but significant short-
run relationships hold. Imprisonment growth, income inequality, alcohol
consumption, and racial composition of the male youth population are shown to
influence the short-run behaviour of violent crime.
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Since Becker’s path-breaking article (Becker, 1968), economists have established
quite successfully a robust link between property crime and incentives generated by
the criminal justice system and background economic conditions (e.g. Pudney et al.,
2000; Pyle and Deadman, 1994; Corman et al., 1987; Sjoquist, 1973).
1 Violent crime,
however, has not received adequate attention by economists and there is little
empirical information about what determines violent behaviour.
2 In recent years,
violent crime has become an important public policy issue worldwide, and the
empirical research concerned with the possible causes of violent felonies has
intensified. An increasing number of recent studies (e.g. Cherry and List, 2002;
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Entorf and Spengler, 2000; Levitt, 1996) have
produced widely divergent results regarding the effects of the criminal justice system
and economic activity on violent crime rates. This may cast serious doubts on the
relevance of economic theory in the determination of violent offences and might
suggest the collaboration of other disciplines in exploring this type of offence.
The objective of this study is to provide a systematic investigation of both
economic and social causes of violent crime offences in the United States over the last
forty years (1960-2000), with the intention of shedding more light on this issue. To
narrow the focus in explaining violent crime, I omit robbery from the analysis as this
might be dominated by economic incentives and could be incorporated in property
crime offences. The econometric modelling technique adopted here is based on
Johansen’s cointegration approach (Johansen, 1988, 1995) which allows for the
estimation of simultaneous relationships between variables, and of both the long and
short-run effects of socio-economic determinants on violent crime rates.
3 Ia r r i v ea t
the following main conclusions. First, the explanation of violent crime is quite
complex. Economic and social factors that influence the short-run behaviour of4
violent crime do not determine it in the long-run. Second, the estimated short-run
elasticities of imprisonment are substantially smaller than those obtained by Marvell
and Moody (1997) and Devine et al. (1988). Third, my evidence is consistent with
previous studies which suggest that unemployment plays a marginal role in violent
crime (e.g. Levitt, 2001; Carmichael and Ward, 2001; Levitt, 1996; Elliot and
Ellingworth, 1996). Fourth, I find a causal link between alcohol consumption and
violent crime, which support findings reported by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001).
This might suggest that alcohol consumption should not be omitted from any violent
crime specification when modelling violent offences.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of the
violent crime literature focusing on the United States. In Section 2 the statistical
framework and the data sources are presented. Section 3 discusses the empirical
findings. The final section concludes the paper.
1. Background
1.1 Do Criminal Sanctions Alter Violent Crime Rates?
Over the past thirty years the United States has been engaged in the very costly policy
of controlling crime by considerably increasing the incapacitation rate. The number of
prisoners serving sentences of at least one year in state and federal institutions has
more than quintupled since the early 1970s and more than doubled since the mid-
1980s. However, the high increase in the incapacitation rate has been accompanied by
a large decline in violent crime rates only during the 1990s (see Figure 1). There is
considerable disagreement between national and state-level studies as to the extent
that changes in imprisonment alter the violent crime rates. Two national-level5
econometric studies including those by Devine et al. (1988) and Marvell and Moody
(1997), found a high negative response of the increase in imprisonment on both
homicide and robbery.
4 Using a state-level approach, however, Levitt (1996) found
that for the offences of homicide and robbery, elasticities were approximately ten
times and four times smaller respectively than those reported in the national-level
studies.
5 Similar conclusions regarding the magnitude of the prison elasticity arise
from an earlier state-level study by Marvell and Moody (1994). Although their
estimates are less than one half of those of Levitt’s (1996), their findings suggest that
the prison elasticities reported in the existing national-level studies might be
implausibly large.
[Figure 1 About Here]
There are two major reasons behind the higher national-level estimates. First,
an increase in the prison population size in one state might reduce crime in other
states (with a lax criminal justice system) where criminals would have moved, if they
were not incarcerated. This is known as the free-rider or spill-over effect (see Marvell
and Moody, 1998). Second, the use of annual national aggregated time-series data
limits researchers to the inclusion of a small range of covariates in crime specification
through their attempts to gain high degrees of freedom for estimation. As pointed out
by Levitt (2001), this might be a weakness of studies based on national time-series
data which seek to identify causal relationships between variables. Despite this
general disagreement, the comparison in the empirical findings of national and state-
level studies uncovers two important similarities. First, these studies do not
distinguish the incapacitation effect from the deterrence and/or rehabilitation effects.6
Second, in studies at both levels, the effect of imprisonment is higher and/or
significant for the crimes with a direct economic motive (including robbery). A more
recent study by Cherry and List (2002), who used county-level panel data and
considered a wide variety of criminal justice variables (the probability of being
arrested, convicted and imprisoned, police size), also conclude that sanctions were
less influential in deterring murder or rape. Similarly, studies dealing with
international and European violent crime rates (e.g. Fajnzylber et al., 2002a; Entorf
and Spengler, 2000) found weak or mixed effects of the criminal justice variables
(e.g., cleared-up rates, police size) on violent crime felonies.
1.2 Does Economic Activity Predict Changes in Violent Behaviour?
Although economic theory points towards a positive effect of unemployment on crime
(see Ehrlich, 1973; Freeman, 1999), several recent studies found that unemployment
exerts an insignificant or even negative effect on violent crime rates.
6 Recent studies
by Levitt (1996, 2001) using state-level panel data for the United States found no
significant impact of the unemployment rate on violent crime offences (with the
exception of robbery). Similar conclusions come from Elliot and Ellingworth (1996)
and Carmichael and Ward (2001) who applied the 1992 British Crime Survey and
county-level data for England and Wales, respectively. Interestingly, other studies
using national and state-level data for the United States (Greenberg, 2001; Raphael
and Winter-Ebmer, 2001), and also the one carried out by Entorf and Spengler (2000)
for Germany, reported a negative association between unemployment and the serious
violent crime offence(s) of rape and/or murder. One plausible explanation for the
negative effect of unemployment on violent crime could be given by making use of7
the routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979).
7 My argument, however, is that
if there is an attempt to establish a link between unemployment and violent crime,
long-term indicators of unemployment rather than the overall unemployment rate
might be better predictors.
8 Long-term unemployment may decrease the possibility of
future employment, exhaust short-term financial resources (Cantor and Land, 1985),
provoke frustration and social upheavals and may contribute to reducing the
individual’s moral values which may result in a turn to crime and delinquency (see
Box, 1987).
Due to a possible motivation by the existing research on property crime,
several authors incorporate in their violent crime models measures of absolute wealth
(e.g., gross domestic product per capita or mean of family income). Economic theory
predicts that an increase in wealth both increases the targets (returns) available for
potential criminals (see Ehrlich, 1973) and at the same time increases the benefits
from legitimate activities.
9 If the former effect dominates the latter then a positive
relationship between measures of absolute wealth and crime should be expected. In
contrast to property crime analysis, the empirical results on violent crime suggest a
negative relationship between measures of absolute wealth and violent crime rates
(see Fajnzylber et al., 2002a; Fajnzylber et al., 2002b; Entorf and Spengler, 2000).
The main difference between these results lies in the emphasis the authors give to a
change in legal (e.g., increase in legal employment opportunities) rather than illegal
income opportunities. Nonetheless, since violent crime is not strongly related to
economic incentives the effect of absolute wealth on violent crime is not
straightforward. This in no way suggests that researchers should not attempt to find an
association between these variables, however, and in this context the use of “relative8
deprivation” indicators (e.g., Gini coefficient) might be more appropriate for violent
crime analysis.
According to economic theory, in areas where there is a large gap in the
income distribution and where low and high-income individuals are mixed there is an
increase in the returns to time allocated to criminal activity (Kelly, 2000). The
common observation that crime is usually carried out between poor individuals does
not imply that the economic theory is invalid. Marris (2003) suggests that individuals
with similar income levels share similar or the same risk premium and levels of
economic incentives which might explain why they steal from each other. Apart from
the economic explanation, sociological theories of crime also give an important view
on this aspect. Strain theory (Merton, 1938), for instance, suggests that inequality
increases the frustration of unsuccessful individuals and thus enhances the tendency to
commit crime against either rich or poor. Both theories seem to apply to violent crime
and the empirical results from several studies point to a strong relationship between
income inequality and violent crime.
10 A recent study by Kelly (2000) found a strong
effect of measured income inequality on both robbery and assault in 200 large
metropolitan countries, but did not find any significant relationship for murder or
rape. More recent studies by Fajnzylber et al. (2002a) and Fajnzylber et al. (2002b),
which focussed on international homicide and robbery, produced strong evidence of a
positive effect of measured income inequality on violent crime felonies. In an early
meta-analysis study by Hsieh and Pugh (1993) violent crime was found to be strongly
associated with both income inequality and poverty.9
1.3 Do Violent Offenders Seem to Act Rationally?
The question regarding whether or not individuals rationally attempt to maximize
their preferences might be one of the most enduring in social sciences. A study by
Simon (1978), and more recently that by Rabin (1998), suggest that individuals act
with limited or bounded rationality. Beginning with Becker’s seminal work (Becker,
1968), the question as to whether criminals are rational individuals has been sharply
debated by both economists and criminologists (see Garoupa, 2003; Manning, 2002;
McCarthy, 2002; Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997). The debate has re-emerged in recent
years especially regarding violent crime offenders. The empirical studies on violent
crime as mentioned in the previous sections suggest that existing economic theory
may not be appropriate to explore violent crime. Violent offenders seem to respond
less to sanctions than property offenders to whom planning and sufficient time is
needed, and economic conditions seem to have a weak or unclear effect on violent
crime. This might be the reason why a number of researchers (e.g. Dilulio, 1996;
Levitt and Donohue, 2001) have turned their interest to certain sociological aspects
that might be associated with the incidence of violence.
In a sense, this study attempts to examine both economic and social
determinants of violent crime. To achieve this goal I include in the model the prison
population size corresponding to the criminal justice system effect on crime and
economic indicators such as duration of unemployment (mean of weeks unemployed)
and income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) as proxies of legal and
illegal income opportunities, respectively. These economic variables may also capture
the social consequences of economic change. Three more variables have been selected
to emphasise the sociological aspects related to crime. The employed female10
population is used as a proxy to one of the myriad changes that has occurred in U.S.
families since the 1960s. Increases in the employed female population increase the
time spent out of homes and contribute to low parental supervision of children and
thus, could be associated with an increase in violent crime rates.
11 Alcohol
consumption is a variable that has seen limited use in violent crime analysis although
experimental findings suggest a causal link between alcohol and offending (see Seto,
1995; Collins, 1981). I consider on-premise alcohol consumption by the 16 to 44 age
group since violent crime usually takes place in or out of pubs/clubs and places where
young people meet. Finally, the percentage of black males in the male youth
population aged 13 to 24 was seen as being more crime prone, and was therefore used
to capture changes in racial composition (see Zimring, 1998; Freeman, 1996; Liska
and Bellair, 1995). This variable corresponds to one used especially in criminological
studies emphasizing the significance of structural or cultural factors on the
explanation of black male violence (see Oliver, 2003). The statistical model and the
data used are discussed briefly in the next section.
2. Statistical Framework and Data
2.1 The Statistical Model
The modelling strategy adopted in this paper is based on a system approach suggested
by Johansen (1988, 1995). Violent crime (lvj,t) and prison population size (lprt)a r e
the variables of primary interest and I attempt to study these through other variables
(lgit,l a l t,l f e t,l d u t,l b l t), where the latter variables are assumed to be weakly
exogenous (see Table 1 for definitions of variables used in this study).
12 The11
assumption of weak exogeneity reduces the dimension of the system, improves
efficiency and can be tested in the marginal model as described by Harbo et al.
(1998). The vector error correction model (VECM) contains an unrestricted
intercept and a restricted linear trend since the variables seem to contain a linear but
not a quadratic trend (see Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). I first estimate the model for
overall violent crime and then individually for murder, rape and assault.
13 Under these
assumptions the conditional and marginal models can be written as follows:
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t y being a myx1 vector of jointly determined (endogenous) I(1) variables and t x
being a mxx1 vector of weakly exogenous I(1) variables and t=1,..,T. Moreover,
￿
is
the difference operator, β α ′ = Π y y is the long-run multiplier matrix of order myxm
(under the assumption that 0 = x α ),
1 − Ω Ω = xx yx ω , xi yi yi Γ − Γ = Γ ω ~ (with dimension
myxm and 1 ,.., 1 − = p i ) captures the short-run dynamic effects, the deterministic
component wt contains dummies, x y y Ψ − Ψ = Ψ ω ~ and xt yt yt v v v ω − = ~ with variance
xy xx yx yy x yy Ω Ω Ω − Ω = Ω
−1
. (see Johansen, 1995).
14 To test the hypothesis that 0 1= c the
likelihood ratio test statistic can be applied. The estimated value is compared to the
95% critical value of the chi-squared distribution.
[Table 1 About Here]12
2.2 Data
The empirical work of this paper employs annual time-series data for the United
States from 1960 to 2000. The data on violent offences were obtained from the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and are expressed in per capita form.
15 An alternative
source of crime statistics is the National Criminal Victimization Survey (NCVS) but
this source only provides data from 1973. In this paper I did not deal with the problem
of under-reporting, which might be an issue especially with crime that carries a social
stigma to victims (rape). Homicide, however, is well-defined in the UCR and suffers
little from under-reporting (see Marvell and Moody, 1997). The data used in this
study are based on official information known to police. The overall number
imprisoned for all crimes is the only available data which goes back as far as 1960.
The prison population is defined as the number of prisoners serving sentences of at
least one year in federal and state institutions and data have been used from various
sources. Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to Present contains data for the years
1960-1970 and those for 1970-1999 are from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States (1998, 2001). The Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin, Prisoners 2000
supplies data for the year 2000. The variable is expressed in per capita form.
16 The
Bureau of the Census provides data for the national population, age structure and
race.
17 Data for the Gini ratio for families also come from the Bureau of Census,
Table F-4.
18 The data for the duration of unemployment (the mean of weeks
unemployed) and the rate of civilian employed female population were obtained from
the Economic Report of the President (2002, see Tables B-44 and B-39 respectively).
Finally, the on-premise alcohol consumption expenditure and the chain-type price
index (1996=100) have been provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA,13
see Tables 2.4 and 7.20 respectively).
19 Table 2 provides summary statistics for the
raw data. The empirical findings are given in the next section.
[Table 2 About Here]
3. Empirical Findings
3.1 Testing for Unit Roots (ADF and Perron Tests)
The initial objective is to obtain a stationary representation of the VAR, Eq. (1).T h e
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was carried out. The null hypothesis is that the
time-series are non-stationary (i.e. series have a unit root or are integrated of order
one, I(1)). Table 3 presents the ADF results on the logarithms of the variables.
20 The
critical values used for accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity
for levels of the violent crime series depend on whether an intercept or intercept and
time trend terms are included in the test regressions. Accordingly, the ADF tests
without and with trend suggest that the violent crime series are I(0) or I(1),
respectively. However, these results may reflect a change in the slope in each of the
violent crime variables since 1993 (see Figure 1). Thus, I have used the Perron test
(see Charemza and Deadman, 1997) to establish the order of integration subject to a
structural break incurred by the introduction of the “three strikes” legislation in 1993.
The results are not presented in detail here, but are available upon request. The
calculated t-values lie above the upper level critical value for the Perron test therefore
the null hypothesis that the violent crime variables are non-stationary cannot be14
rejected.
21 On the basis of these results, the violent crime series are interpreted as I(1).
The ADF tests suggests that the explanatory variables used in the study are integrated
of order one, I(1).
22
[Table 3 About Here]
The results of the unit root tests suggest that the use of a static regression by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may be expected to produce spurious results. To avoid
the problem of non-stationarity of the time-series, the first difference of the variables
can be used. However, using relationships where the variables are expressed in
differences provide short-run information and leads to the loss of useful long-run
information. For instance, previous research on violent crime (e.g., Levitt, 1996)
provides estimates of short-run effects, but there is no information about long-run
effects. However, economists who analyse criminal behaviour have become quite
interested in establishing a stable long-run relationship between crime and its
determinants (e.g., Witt and Witte, 2000; Scorcu and Cellini, 1998; Pyle and
Deadman, 1994). The next section gives an answer to the question of whether a
cointegrating relationship between violent crime and socio-economic variables holds.
3.2 Cointegration Analysis
A test for cointegration using the Johansen’s maximum likelihood method described
in the previous section (2.1) is applied, in order to identify the cointegrating rank r
and to provide estimates of the cointegrating and adjusted matrices. Before
determining the number of cointegrating vectors, it is necessary to choose the order of15
the lags in the VAR, which should be large enough to ensure that the error terms in
the equations are not autocorrelated, but small enough to enable estimation. Given
that there are only 41 observations, I use a lag length of two (p=2) in the VARs, thus
minimizing the loss in the number of observations that are available for estimation
and ensuring that the errors are white noise. Table 4 presents the residual diagnostic
tests for the unrestricted VAR models. The results suggest that there is no evidence of
serial correlation, ARCH effect and nonnormality in the residuals.
[Table 4 About Here]
According to the economic crime literature, each violent crime offence and the
prison population might be simultaneously determined and thus should be treated as
endogenous (see Levitt, 1996). The other economic variables are treated as weakly
exogenous according to the economic priors. Under this assumption, the cointegration
analysis is performed assuming unrestricted intercepts and, since the variables seem to
contain a linear trend, I conjecture the presence of a restricted trend to the
cointegration space (see eq.(1)). The null hypothesis is in terms of the cointegration
rank r and, for example, rejection of r=0 is evidence in favour of at least one
cointegrating vector. The non-uniformity among the trace statistic, the maximum
eigenvalue and the use of model selection criteria to identify the existence of a long-
run relationship is a common occurrence. However, in this case both trace statistic
and maximum eigenvalue statistics do not reject the null hypothesis that there is no
cointegration among the variables included in the VARs (namely r=0). Thus,
￿ y in
eq. (1) is completely deficient in rank, rank(
￿ y)=0, for each violent crime model.16
Table 5 presents the results of the cointegration test based only on the trace of the
stochastic matrix for reasons of brevity.
[Table 5 About Here]
Violent crime has a variety of motives, and it may not operate in a predicted
direction in the long-run as that which occurs to some extent with crimes which have
economic incentives. As suggested by Field (1990), crime might be influenced by
short-term influences which may be different from its long-term determinants. This
makes the analysis of violent crime quite complex. Particular attention should be
given to the lack of a long-run relationship for rape, which may need to be
distinguished from the explanation of other types of violent crime. It can be argued
that an increase in forcible rape might be due to either or both an increase in the
effective rate of rape and/or the decision to report rape. Hence, the inability to
distinguish between the determinants of these two factors might make the analysis
problematic. Furthermore, the results of the cointegration analysis suggest that there is
no long-run relationship between any of the violent crime felonies and prison
population size. If imprisonment deters and incapacitates criminals, but has the
opposite effect on rehabilitation of criminal preferences (especially for longer term
prisoners), for instance, due to the stigma and depreciation of human capital
associated with being in prison (see Avio, 1998), it might be expected that these two
effects would cancel each other in the long-run. Additionally, Freeman (1996)
suggested that a large number of inmates rejoin the society with reduced labour
market skills and enhanced criminal skills and therefore have a high recidivism rate.
Similarly, some recent studies have failed to identify a stable long-run
relationship between crime and economic conditions. For instance, Scorcu and Cellini17
(1998) in considering the offences of homicide, robbery and theft did not find any
long-run relationship between crime and economic conditions using similar
econometric techniques.
23 The lack of long-run relationships has also been observed
in property crime studies. For example, a study by Hale (1998) examining property
crime in England and Wales using cointegration techniques found no long-run
relationship between unemployment and property crime offences. Does the lack of
cointegration suggest that there is no relationship between the variables? Britt (2001)
proposes that while the lack of cointegration implies that there is no long-term
equilibrium relationship between the series, it should not be concluded that no short-
run relationship exists among the examined variables. The possibility that a slowly
changing short-term relationship exists between violent crime and the explanatory
variables is examined in the next section.
3.3 Short-run Determinants of Violent Crime
To examine the short run relationship we consider a dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimation, which is simply the VAR model for the process in logarithmic
differences (growth rates). The short-run model can be simply written as:
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t j t j
d lbl lbl ldu ldu lfe
lfe lal lal i i lpr lv lv
ε β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β
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where
￿ is a difference operator, t denotes time and j=1,..,4 (see Table 1). As can be
seen in the short-run model, Eq.(3), the prison population growth rate in year t was
(3)18
not included in the regression in an attempt to surmount possible simultaneity bias
between crime and the prison population.
T h eO L Sr e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e6 .
24 The estimates obtained for the
overall violent crime rate, which does not include robbery, are similar to those
produced for assault. This is not surprising since assault accounts for about 60 percent
of overall violent crime when robbery is included and approximately 90 percent
otherwise. The estimated elasticity for imprisonment is highly significant for murder
and rape. I found that a 10 percent increase in the prison population is associated with
6.2 and 6.5 percent fewer murders and rapes, respectively. My estimates are less than
half of those obtained by previous national-level studies including those by Devine et
al. (1988) and Marvell and Moody (1997), but are almost four times higher than those
found by Levitt (1996) in a state-level study. The only exception is for assault and
hence, for overall violent crime where I found a smaller elasticity but which was close
to those reported by both national and state-level studies. Similar to previous findings,
the analysis is limited to an estimation of the full effect of imprisonment and does not
separate the incapacitation effect from those of deterrence or rehabilitation effects.
The analysis, however, reveals that an increase in incarceration rates has contributed
to violent crime reduction and can be assumed an effective policy in controlling
crime. But is this the most effective policy? The answer is quite complicated.
Imprisonment is a very costly exercise, which entails a large amount of spending from
states’ and Federal government’s budget. Recently, there has been some shift in the
policy recommendations from certain researchers towards the early prevention of
crime (e.g. Witt and Witte, 2000; Greenwood, 1998) or to establishing private prisons
(see Avio, 1998).19
[Table 6 About Here]
Income inequality as measured by the index of income concentration (Gini
coefficient) has a significant and positive effect only on murder. I found that a 10
percent increase in income inequality increase murders approximately by the same
percentage. My results are consistent with previous findings (e.g. Fajnzylber et al.,
2002a ; Fajnzylber et al., 2002b) that emphasise the role of income inequality
in the determination of the offence of murder. The positive relationship between
income inequality and murder implies on the one hand, that murders might be
committed as a by-product of crime with economic incentives and on the other, might
be committed due to sociological aspects as suggested by strain theory (Merton,
1938). The on-premise alcohol consumption variable is significant at or around the 10
percent level with murder and rape, but interestingly not so with assault. My results
support those obtained by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) who found a positive
effect for alcohol consumption on overall violent crime in a state-level study. Using
data for England and Wales, Ensor and Godfrey (1993) and Field (1990) also found a
positive effect for alcohol consumption on violent crime. There are some explanations
behind this causal link. First, there are psychopharmacological theories that suggest
that alcohol consumption is associated with violent behaviour (see Seto, 1995;
Collins, 1981). In this circumstance, alcohol consumption might affect an individual’s
rationality during the process of the cost-benefit analysis of engaging in crime.
Second, alcohol maybe consumed by offenders after committing the crime in an
attempt to excuse their behaviour. Third, alcohol consumption might reduce the
ability to assess or deal with potential dangers and thus, increase victimization.20
The employed female population was found to have an insignificant effect on
violent crime rates. In contrast to this study, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) found
a significant positive effect for the employed female population on rape in the United
States. Similarly, Witt and Witte (2000) reported a positive and significant effect for
the female labour force participation on the U.S. overall crime rate. Focusing on the
rape equation, even though I attempted to drop those variables with elasticities that
were highly insignificant, no significant relationship was found between the employed
female population and rape. Unemployment duration carried mixed signs in different
violent crime felonies, but none of the estimated elasticities were statistically
significant, hence supporting previous findings (e.g. Carmichael and Ward, 2001;
Levitt, 2001, Levitt, 1996). In Greenberg’s (2001) study, however, unemployment
duration was found to have a negative and significant effect on homicide. Due to the
fact that Greenberg’s model omits potentially important explanatory variables in the
murder specification (e.g. prison population, measures of inequality) the estimated
elasticity for unemployment duration raises serious doubts (see Levitt, 2001).
Changes in the percentage of black males in the male youth population have a
positive and significant effect on all types of violent crime. This is in line with
previous studies (e.g. Levitt 2001; Liska and Bellair, 1995) that emphasize a positive
relationship between racial composition and violent crime rates. However, behind the
causes of the high level of black offending (see Freeman, 1996) there is also an
important point given by Hindeland (1978) who emphasized the fact that blacks are
overrepresented in arrest statistics and are more likely to be apprehended. This study
does not deal with this aspect since there is limited data available. Finally, the “three
strikes” policy adopted in 1993 might explain part of the recent fall in violent crime
rates. This policy gives credit to selective incapacitation strategies by increasing the21
prison term for criminals convicted of a third serious crime (see Blumstein and
Wallman, 2000). The “three strikes” dummy carries the expected sign and is
significant for all violent crime felonies. An issue for further research is whether the
“three strikes” legislation operates as a deterrent or has an incapacitation effect. The
diagnostic test statistic indicates that my estimates do not suffer from serial
correlation, functional misspecification, nonnormality or heteroscedasticity in any of
the violent crime equations.
4. Concluding Remarks
This study examines economic and social determinants of violent crime in the United
States over the period 1960 to 2000. The econometric technique used is based on
Johansen’s (1995, 1988) cointegration approach and attempts to establish a long-run
and short-run relationship between violent crime and its determinants. This research is
distinguished from previous studies (e.g. Levitt, 1996) by focusing on both long and
short-run determinants of violent crime rather than only on short-run effects.
However, the results of the cointegration analysis indicate that there is no
cointegrating vector for the examined variables making the question regarding the
long-run determinants of violent crime quite complex. The analysis was forced to
provide only short-run information.
The effects of prison population on violent crimes are substantially smaller
than those produced by Devine et al. (1988) and Marvell and Moody (1997), and are
closer to Levitt’s (1996). Economic conditions are found to have a marginal role in
violent crime rates with the exception of murder, where it was found to be strongly
associated with income inequality. This suggests that murder might be related to
economic crimes or more specifically, may be committed as a by-product of crimes22
with economic incentives. On the other hand, I found a causal link between on-
premise alcohol consumption and the serious offences of murder and rape. This
emphasizes that alcohol consumption might be an important predictor of violent crime
and should not be omitted from the violent crime specification. No significant
relationship was found between the employed female population and violent crime
felonies which is in contrast to previous studies. Finally, violent crime rates were
found to be closely associated with changes in the racial composition of the male
youth population.
In conclusion, the exploration of violent crime is much more complicated than
property crime due to the variety of motivations that the former might have. The
empirical results reveal that murder is better predicted in the short-run than other
types of violent offences, however, it seems not to be affected by the long-run pattern
of the socio-economic factors adopted in this study. The collaboration of other
disciplines and the theoretical integration of different theories of crime may be
required in order to explain and thus, curb this type of offence.23
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1 According to the neoclassical economic approach to crime (Becker, 1968), criminals are viewed as
rational individuals who base their decision to commit crime on an analysis of the expected cost and
benefit of engaging in criminal activity.
2 According to the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports (U.C.R.) violent crime consists of offences of murder
and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault.
3 Cointegration techniques have seen considerable use especially within the United Kingdom in
studying property crime (e.g. Hale, 1998; Pyle and Deadman, 1994). However, the application of this
statistical framework to crime has been very limited in the United States. Concerning violent crime, as
far as I am aware the one exception is the work by Greenberg (2001), who used cointegration methods
to examine violent crime rates in the United States.
4 The estimated elasticities reported by Devine et al. (1988) are –1.47 for the offence of homicide and
-2.62 for robbery. Marvell and Moody’s (1997) estimations for homicide and robbery are -1.33 and
-2.57, respectively. Both studies did not examine the serious offence of rape, although Marvell and
Moody (1997) did study assault and the estimated elasticity was found to be –0.53.
5 Levitt’s (1996) study accounts for the possibility of simultaneity bias between prison population size
and crime rates and found that the elasticity for overall violent crime is –0.379 and statistically
different from zero. However, in disaggregating the violent crime data into individual violent crime
felonies, none of the reported elasticities for homicide (-0.147), assault (-0.41) or rape (-0.246) were
found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The estimated elasticity for assault was similar to
Marvell and Moody’s (1997) and statistically significant at around the 10 percent level.
6 Ehrlich (1973) considers the time allocation model. This model assumes that crime and employment
are substitute activities and thus, the more time one devotes to legitimate occupation, the less time one24
has to develop criminal behaviour. This assumption has been criticized by a number of commentators
(e.g., Entorf and Spengler, 2002) suggesting that it may not explain crime committed by juvenile and
low-paid individuals.
7 For instance, unemployment might reduce the exposure time of individuals in “unsafe” public places
and increase the guardianship of property and children (Entorf and Spengler, 2002).
8 Greenberg (2001) examined the effect of both the unemployment rate and the duration of
unemployment (mean of weeks unemployed) on both homicide and robbery for the United States and
found negative relationships. Recent studies by Fajnzylber et al. (2002a) and Fajnzylber et al. (2002b)
did not consider the unemployment rate or long-term unemployment in modelling international
homicide and robbery.
9 Ehrlich (1973) found a low effect of the mean of family income for both murder and rape.
10 Patterson (1991) failed to identify a significant relationship between measures of household income
inequality and violent crime rates.
11Both the routine activity (Cohen and Felson, 1979) and differential association (Sutherland, 1942)
theories introduce the importance of this variable in explaining crime rates. Previous studies (e.g.
Entorf and Spengler, 2002; Witt and Witte, 2000) have considered the effect of the female labour force
on crime. However, since the female labour force includes both the employed and unemployed female
population, it can be argued that the size of female employment would be a better proxy.
12 Levitt (1996) suggests that prison population size and crime rates might be simultaneously
determined and therefore, should be treated as endogenous. An increase in prison population size
affects crime rates, and also an increase in crime rates affects prison population size.
13 In this study overall violent crime includes the offences of murder, rape and assault.
14 There is much concern as to whether the inclusion of dummy variables in the vector autoregressive
(VAR) model changes the asymptotic distribution of the trace statistic for cointegration rank
(see Johansen et al., 2000; Johansen, 1995). This paper does not make an attempt to address this issue.
15 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Section 3.
16 I would like to thank Jo Ann Van Atta of the Uniform Crime Reporting Programme for informing
me that data for the percentage of offences cleared, which could have been used as an alternative
criminal justice variable, were not available at the national-level prior to 1970. An econometric25
analysis using the post-1970 data would severely curtail the degrees of freedom available for
estimation and therefore such a modelling strategy was not adopted in this study.
17 I am grateful to the Department of Population and Housing Statistics, for providing me with data for
the period 1960-1979.
18 The index of income concentration (or Gini index) is a statistical measure derived from the Lorenz
Curve. The Gini index rate ranges from “0” (indicating perfect equality) to “1” (indicating perfect
inequality). The term “family” refers to a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or
adoption and residing together (For further details see Current Population Reports, 1979, pp. 264-265).
19 The Bureau of Economic Analysis uses the term 'other alcoholic beverages' (Table 2.4 Personal
Consumption Expenditures by Type of Expenditure) which includes alcoholic beverages purchased for
on-premise consumption, such as at bars, sporting events, etc.
20 For completeness I present the ADF results both without and with trend. The decision to include a
trend in the ADF test is usually based on the plots of the time-series. If the DF or ADF test (without
controlling for a time trend in the regression) is carried out on a trend-stationary series it will probably
have little power of rejecting a unit root (see Wooldridge, 2000).
21 The postulated break point lies 34/41 parts (or 0.829) through the sample data, hence the value of
￿
may be taken as (1-0.829) or 0.2. For a test at the 5% significance level with 41 observations and a
value of
￿ = 0.2, the lower and upper critical values are –3.39 and –3.32 respectively (see Charemza
and Deadman, 1997).
22 Surprisingly, the first difference of the prison population per capita series appears non-stationary
when the ADF test is applied (sample period 1963-2000). However, when the ADF unit root test was
performed on the post-1969 sample for the imprisonment variable the results indicated that the series is
clearly I(1). Therefore, the imprisonment series is assumed to be I(1) rather than I(2) in this study.
23 Allowing for the possibility of a regime shift, a long-run relationship was detected.
24 I have also experimented with estimating the short-run models by adding two lags to the variables in
differences to allow for the possibility of lagged effects. However, none of the estimated elasticities of
the second lag in differences for each model were individually significant at the 0.05 level. I also
conducted a joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the second lag in differences for the
violent crime models. In each case the values of the F test statistic (0.95, 0.69, 1.41 and 0.82) were26
smaller than the theoretical value of
05 . 0
17 , 7 F and therefore the joint null hypothesis of zero coefficients
cannot be rejected.27
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aData are indexed using 1960 as a base year. All underlying
variables are in per capita form.33
bAll the violent crime and socio-economic variables are in natural logarithms.
Table 1: List of Variables and their Descriptions in the VAR Analysis
b
lvj,t: Violent crime per capita. j indicates different types of violent crime
(j=1: Overall violent crime (lvct); j=2: Murder (lmut); j=3: Rape (lrat); j=4:
Assault (last))
lprt: Prison population per capita
lgit: Gini coefficient
lalt: Real on-premise alcohol consumption expenditures per persons aged 16-44
lfet: Percentage of employed female population
ldut: Duration of unemployment (mean of weeks unemployed)
lblt: Percentage of black males in the male youth population (13-24)
dt: “Three Strikes” dummy variable (d=1 for t
￿ 1993 and d=0 for t
￿ 1992)34
Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1960-2000
Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Overall violent crime (without robbery) 718,016.8 362,269.1 180,620 1,266,147
Specific felony offences
Murder and non-negligent manslaughter 17,855.2 4,805.6 8,530 24,703
Forcible rape 66,950.9 30,645 17,190 109,062
Aggravated assault 633,211.1 328,522.2 154,320 1,135,607
Other
Overall population (thousands) 227,861.7 27,647.6 180,671 275,372
Population aged 16-44 (thousands) 97,700.5 17,333.7 68,957 116,950
Overall prison population 508,784.5 370,699.6 187,914 1,321,137
Gini index 0.38 0.03 0.348 0.43
Alcohol consumption expenditures
(billions of dollars) 18.9 14.25 4.3 52.1
Chain-type price index (1996=100) 54.3 31.16 18.48 112.74
Employed female population (%) 46.8 7.38 35.4 57.7
Duration of unemployment (mean of
weeks unemployed) 13.56 2.96 7.8 20
Black males aged 13-24 (%) 13.15 1.43 10.79 15.0435
Table 3: ADF Unit Root Tests
c
Without trend With trend
Variable Levels First Diff. Levels First Diff.
lvc -3.094 -1.704 0.259 -3.464
lmu -2.759 -2.575 -1.749 -3.673
lra -3.444 -2.661 -0.544 -4.849
las -3.028 -1.642 0.404 -3.322
lpr -0.227 -2.118 -3.074 -2.074
lgi 0.406 -5.069 -2.770 -5.567
lal -0.212 -3.362 -0.502 -3.971
lfe -1.473 -4.390 -2.144 -4.591
ldu -2.936 -4.990 -3.833 -4.912
lbl -2.808 -2.364 -0.206 -3.727
cThe figures reported are the t-ratios of the estimated coefficients α
in the regression
t t t t ε χ δ αχ µ χ + ∆ + + = ∆ − − 1 1 (without
tend) or t t t t t ε χ δ αχ γ µ χ + ∆ + + + = ∆ − − 1 1 (with trend ),
and β in the regression
t t t t x ε χ δ β µ χ + ∆∆ + ∆ + = ∆∆ − − 1 1
(without trend) or
t t t t x t ε χ δ β γ µ χ + ∆∆ + ∆ + + = ∆∆ − − 1 1 (with
trend) for the levels and first differences (sample period 1963-2000),
respectively. Critical values at the 5% level are as follows: without
trend -2.94 and with trend –3.5313.36
Table 4: Residual Diagnostic Tests for the VAR Equations
d
Model 1
Endogenous Variables LMSC(2) ARCH(1) N(2)
lvc 1.07 [0.3] 0.11 [0.7] 1.37 [0.5]
lpr 1.06 [0.4] 0.03 [0.8] 2.72 [0.2]
Model 2
lmu 0.48 [0.6] 0.62 [0.4] 0.79 [0.7]
lpr 1.18 [0.3] 0.06 [0.8] 1.98 [0.4]
Model 3
lra 0.16 [0.8] 0.37 [0.5] 1.31 [0.5]
lpr 1.04 [0.4] 0.3E-3 [0.9] 2.16 [0.3]
Model 4
las 1.37 [0.3] 0.15 [0.7] 1.53 [0.5]
lpr 1.07 [0.3] 0.04 [0.8] 2.86 [0.2]
dLMSC(2) is a test for up to second-order serial correlation F (2,26). ARCH is a
test for conditional heteroscedasticity F (1,26) and N(2) is the Jarque-Bera test
for normality. The p-values are in square brackets.37
Table 5: A Cointegration Analysis of U.S. Violent Crime
e





Trace statistics 39.51* 7.14
95% quantile 49.3 25.3





Trace statistics 42* 7.74
95% quantile 49.3 25.3





Trace statistics 44.19* 12
95% quantile 49.3 25.3





Trace statistics 40.1* 7.51
95% quantile 49.3 25.3
eThe critical values have been obtained from Harbo et al. (1998)
*Insignificant at the 5 % level.38







￿ lvct-1 -0.12 (0.17)
￿ lmut-1 0.17 (0.16)
￿ lrat-1 -0.29 (0.18)
￿ last-1 -0.093 (0.17)
￿ lprt-1 -0.29 (0.18) -0.62* (0.21) -0.65* (0.22) -0.25 (0.19)
￿ lgit 0.35 (0.42) 1.009* (0.47) 0.067 (0.5) 0.36 (0.44)
￿ lgit-1 0.49 (0.41) 1.1* (0.48) 0.2 (0.49) 0.49 (0.43)
￿ lalt 0.20 (0.17) 0.37
† (0.2) 0.36
† (0.21) 0.18 (0.18)
￿ lalt-1 0.15 (0.20) 0.42
† (0.24) 0.3 (0.24) 0.11 (0.21)
￿ lfet -0.18 (0.69) -1.02 (0.77) 1.08 (0.82) -0.3 (0.72)
￿ lfet-1 0.45 (0.82) 0.97 (0.93) 0.27 (0.99) 0.48 (0.86)
￿ ldut -0.0065 (0.08) -0.046 (0.1) 0.08 (0.1) -0.016 (0.09)
￿ ldut-1 -0.09 (0.06) -0.12 (0.08) -0.075 (0.08) -0.085 (0.07)
￿ lblt 4.32* (1.98) 4.64
† (2.4) 5.08* (2.33) 4.1
† (2.1)
￿ lblt-1 -1.1 (1.82) -2.3 (2.02) -0.19 (2.17) -1.2 (1.91)
dt -0.085* (0.02) -0.074* (0.02) -0.07* (0.02) -0.085* (0.02)
Const 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.017 (0.02) 0.033 (0.02)
R
2 0.753 0.806 0.74 0.73
￿ 0.031 0.035 0.037 0.033
N(1962-2000) 39
LMSC(2), F(2,23) 1.73 [0.199] 1.9 [0.171] 1.44 [0.257] 1.86 [0.18]
ARCH(1), F(1,24) 0.56 [0.461] 0.03 [0.86] 4.3
† [0.5] 0.62 [0.44]
N(2) 4.92
† [0.08] 2.35 [0.309] 1.08 [0.582] 5.25
† [0.07]
Het, F(1,37) 0.04 [0.84] 2.43 [0.13] 1.44 [0.24] 0.03 [0.87]
RESET, F(1,24) 0.92 [0.35] 0.98 [0.33] 0.39 [0.54] 1.03 [0.32]
f In the first panel standard errors of coefficients are in brackets. In the
second panel p values are in square brackets.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level,
†Statistically significant at the 10% level.